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Marwan M. Kraidy is an expert on Arab media and an associate professor at the Annenberg School for Communication at
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Recommendations
Transform the Framework of Global Engagement
• Eschew the polarizing rhetoric and unilateral impulses of the “global war on terror.” Reinvest in multilateral institutions and initiatives.
• Address the socioeconomic impact of globalization
on Arab societies and perceptions of globalization in
Arab public opinion.
• Forget about branding the USA and focus on explaining US policies. Branding requires a consistency that
is impossible to achieve in US foreign policy.
• Rely on “pull” media that make content available
for broad and deep engagement; abandon “push”
media that is akin to propaganda.

Modify the Structure of US Public Diplomacy
• Create a specialized office to coordinate and supervise public diplomacy efforts, whose head should
be a special advisor to the president based in the
White House.

• Put career diplomats in charge of US public diplomacy. Engage and involve the private sector, but do not
put it in the driver’s seat.
• Focus on tactical engagement within a broad strategic vision that emphasizes sustainable long-term
gains over short-term desired outcomes.

Recommendations for Specific Actions
• Shut down Al-Hurra Television.
• Reaffirm US commitment to the Geneva Convention;
shut down Guantanamo Bay and launch a campaign
taking responsibility for harsh prisoner treatment.
• Triple funding for the Fulbright program to and
from Arab-speaking countries in the areas of communication, journalism, and media studies.
• Double overall funding and re-focus public diplomacy toward two-way exchanges and away from
one-way advertising.

• Intensify language training and establish a structure
of incentives.

Policy Analysis Briefs are thought-provoking contributions to the public debate over peace and security issues. The views expressed in this brief are
those of the author and not necessarily those of the Stanley Foundation. The author’s affiliation is listed for identification purposes only.
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Introduction
During the past decade and especially in the
aftermath of September 11, 2001, numerous
polls and surveys have underscored that the
image of the United States in the Middle East has
steadily deteriorated. After the invasion of Iraq, a
survey conducted by the Pew Charitable Trusts in
2003 found that “the bottom has fallen out of
support for America in most of the Muslim
world.”1 A poll by Zogby International commissioned by the Arab American Institute, released
in December 2006, found that respondents in five
Arab countries had worse opinions of the United
States than they had one year earlier, 62% in
Saudi Arabia, 72% in Egypt, 57% in Morocco,
76% in Jordan, and 47% in Lebanon, compared
respectively to 9%, 4%, 1%, 1%, and 10% of
respondents in the same countries who had a better opinion of the United States a year earlier.2
More recently, a June 2007 report by the Pew
Charitable Trusts found that “The US image
remains abysmal in most Muslim countries in the
Middle East and Asia.”3
This persistently negative image poses a formidable
challenge to the ability of the United States to
engage the Arab region, casting a cloud of suspicion
over US political, economic, and cultural initiatives.
Throughout the Arab world, US policymakers are
suspected of ulterior motives and double standards.
Especially troubling is the fact that terrorist groups
like Al Qaeda have deftly drawn on hostility toward
the United States in their propaganda efforts. The
question posed about Osama bin Laden’s communication skills six weeks after September 11, 2001, by
longtime diplomat Richard Holbrooke, still haunts
US policymakers: “How can a man in a cave outcommunicate the world’s leading communications
society?”4 Answering this question and remedying
the situation that it reflects is vital for US interests.
Nonetheless, as the Center for Strategic and
International Studies Commission on Smart Power
recently put it, “[r]ecent US administrations have
struggled to get public diplomacy right.”5
Over the last few years, several studies, commissions, reports, and assessments have attempted to
understand the Arab media context, diagnose the
US image crisis, and issue recommendations on
how to remedy the deteriorating “hearts and
minds” situation. These include:
• “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force
on Managed Information Dissemination” (2001),

by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
• “Building America’s Public Diplomacy through a
Reformed Structure and Additional Resources”
(2002), by the US Advisory Commission on
Public Diplomacy.
• “Strengthening US-Muslim Communications”
(2003), by the Center for the Study of the
Presidency.
• “How to Reinvigorate US Public Diplomacy”
(2003), by the Heritage Foundation.
• “The Youth Factor: The New Demographics of
the Middle East and the Implications for US
Policy” (2003), by the Brookings Institution.
• “Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for
Reinvigorating US Public Diplomacy” (2003),
sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.
• “Arab Media: Tools for the Governments,
Tools for the People” (2005), by the United
States Institute of Peace.
• “Open Media and Transitioning Societies in the
Middle East: Challenges for US Security Policy”
(2006), by the Stanley Foundation.
• “US Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts
to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain
Communication Elements and Face Significant
Challenges” (GAO-06-535, May 2006), by the
Government Accountability Office.
• “US International Broadcasting: Management
of Middle East Broadcasting Services Could Be
Improved” (GAO, 06-762, August 2006), also
by the Government Accountability Office.
• “A Smarter, More Secure America” (2007), by
the Center for International and Strategic
Studies Commission on Smart Power.
Though most of these reports make useful recommendations, public diplomacy efforts toward the
Arab world are hampered by several challenges.
These include: a lack of awareness of the history
of international broadcasting to the Arab world;
a lack of knowledge of the current Arab media
and communication environment; an approach
that focuses on “branding” the United States and

finding instruments to get to the “hearts and
minds” of Arabs; a lack of understanding of what
communication can and cannot achieve; and an
unwillingness to address the gap between US
rhetoric and US action, while ignoring some
basic, commonsensical steps that can begin to
restore the US standing in the region.
Because it has one of the most complex and
dynamic media sectors in the world, the Arabicspeaking region will continue to pose a great
challenge to US policy and public diplomacy.
However, formulating smarter policies, learning
historical lessons, understanding the complex
Arab media scene, taking heed of the impact of
globalization and Arab experiences of that
impact, recognizing the limits of “branding” as a
label applied to a nation as globally powerful and
visible as the United States, and engaging partners
and institutions in a new multilateralism would
be excellent steps moving forward. To have a
chance of success, these actions should take into
account historical factors that shape Arab receptions of US messages.

Two Historical Lessons
Two historical reasons contribute to an inhospitable ground for US broadcasts. Since before
World War II, Arabs have been bombarded by
international propaganda broadcasts from other
Arab nations, Nazi Germany, France, the United
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. At the
height of the Cold War, Arabic was second only
to English as an international broadcasting language.6 This long exposure makes listeners and
viewers suspicious of foreign government
attempts to influence their feelings and opinions.
Arab viewers today feel hounded by the media of
foreign countries. In addition to the United
States’ Al-Hurra, there is Iran’s Al-Alam, Russia’s
Russia Today, the UK’s BBC Arabic service,
Germany’s Deutsche Welle’s Arabic broadcasts,
and the Arabic broadcasts of France 24. As a
result, US Arabic broadcasts contend in an
intensely competitive field with high levels of
attention scarcity.
Learning from history is important, but applying the wrong lessons from history leads to misguided policies. Specifically, applying Cold
War-era propaganda standards to the contemporary Middle East is counterproductive. Foreign
broadcasts might have been useful when there
were no alternatives to unreliable government

media sources in the targeted regions. People living behind the Iron Curtain were for the most
part thirsty for information. Homemade, dissident samizdat distributed from person to person
often were the only options to the official line
from Moscow. In contrast, Arabs today are
awash in information of all kinds, delivered
through various media platforms. As a result,
Arabs have become increasingly discriminating
users of media.
With a plethora of Arab media reflecting a broad
ideological spectrum, foreign broadcasts come
across as dubious in motivation, redundant in
content, and preachy in tone. Furthermore, the
Arab world has not witnessed a dramatic systemic change like the collapse of the Soviet
Union, which allowed the United States to move
robustly into the former sphere of Soviet influence. During the 1990s USAID provided around
$175 million in media assistance for Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union. By some
accounts, more than 1600 broadcasters and
30,000 journalists benefited and, as a result, a
dozen national television services reaching a total
of 200 million viewers were established.7 In contrast, Arab media were spurred less by US aid
and more by the Arab world’s own mixture of
geopolitical tensions, petrodollars, and the
advent of technologies like geostationary satellites. The communication environment in the
Arab world is vastly more complex and competitive than the post-Soviet media scene.

The Challenging Arab Media Scene
In the past two decades, the media sector in the
Arab world has experienced a regional growth
whose speed and scope are unprecedented in the
contemporary world. In 1990 Arab states controlled virtually all aspects of media activities
occurring within their territories. They owned
production and broadcasting facilities, had the
final say on what went on the air, and to a large
extent could influence what their populations listened to and watched. Nearly without exception,
national television systems used terrestrial (nonsatellite) broadcasting for purposes of fostering
socioeconomic development, enhancing national
unity, and regime propaganda.
In contrast, in 2007, there are a few hundred television channels broadcasting to the entire Arab
world, most of them privately owned though
influenced by governments. These channels span
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a wide ideological spectrum and reflect competing political, economic, and religious agendas.
They offer viewers news, political and social talkshows, variety and music shows, drama series,
reality TV, American sports and sitcoms, Latin
American soap operas, Hollywood movies, and
European documentaries.8 In this rapidly changing environment, government media have lost
viewers, prestige, and influence, and struggle to
stay relevant by playing catch-up to private
media. These drastic regional developments present an extremely competitive communication
environment for US public diplomacy in the
Arab world.
Understanding the factors that have driven the
Arab media explosion is a prerequisite for successful communication with the Arab world.
After Arab audiences turned en masse to international broadcasters like BBC and CNN for information about Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
the establishment of Arabic language equivalents
became a priority for the Saudi ruling class seeking to extend its political and economic influence
over the region, a process it started with a media
buying spree in the 1980s. As a result, politically
connected Saudi businessmen launched various
satellite channels from London and Rome. At the
same time, the Egyptian government launched the
Egyptian Satellite Channel mainly for Egyptian
troops stationed in Kuwait for the 1991 Gulf War
to counter Iraqi propaganda.
Since then, Arab governments have sought to influence pan-Arab media developments, indirectly in
the case of the Saudis, and directly in the case of the
Egyptians. The Saudi elite has a near monopoly
over most pan-Arab print and broadcast media,
and Egyptian state-run or state-directed media only
have influence over Egyptians within and outside of
Egypt. Jordanian and Syrian government-owned
satellite broadcasters routinely rank at the bottom
of the ratings, while Jordanian and Syrian viewers
turn to privately owned channels based in Beirut,
Doha, and Dubai. The success of Al-Jazeera has
been at least partly due to the degree of separation
from the Qatari government that the channel
maintains. (This seems to be changing, as the
recent rapprochement between Qatar and Saudi
Arabia appears to have restrained Al-Jazeera’s coverage of Saudi affairs.) Several complicating factors notwithstanding, the lesson is clear. Direct
government ownership or involvement in broadcasting turns viewers off, a message that public

diplomacy practitioners in Washington ought to
hear loud and clear.
The sheer complexity of the Arab media environment must also be taken into account. Though
Al-Jazeera is the most recognized and fretted
about pan-Arab satellite channel, there are more
than 300 satellite channels broadcasting in
Arabic to an audience residing between Morocco
and Iraq, in addition to worldwide cable distribution for some channels. Among these, there are a
dozen influential outlets, including the Qatarbased Al-Jazeera; the Saudi-owned, UAE-based
Al-Arabiya and Middle East Broadcasting Center
(MBC); UAE-based Dubai Television and Abu
Dhabi Television; the Lebanese-Saudi owned,
Lebanese-based LBC-Al-Hayat; and Hezbollah’s
Lebanese-based Al-Manar. In addition, there are
numerous channels specialized in business
(CNBC Arabiya, Al-Aqariya and Al-Iqtisadiyya),
women’s issues (Heya TV), religion (Al-Rissala,
Al-Majd, Iqraa’), and music (Rotana, Music Plus,
Melody), in addition to state satellite channels. It
is important to note that the sector remains in a
state of flux, with new players coming on the
scene on a monthly basis each month. (In
November 2007 the daily Al-’Arab was relaunched in Qatar with plans for a pan-Arab
readership, and Hariri-owned Future TV is
poised to launch a satellite news network from
Beirut). However, there are unmistakable signals
of a trend toward consolidation, with the merger
of LBC’s satellite operation and Rotana in the summer of 2007, the fact that several channels have
restructured themselves as multi-platform networks, such as the Al-Jazeera Network (Al-Jazeera,
Al-Jazeera English, Al-Jazeera Children’s Channel,
Al-Jazeera Live, Al-Jazeera Sports, Al-Jazeera
Documentaries) and the MBC Group (Al-Arabiya,
MBC 1, MBC 2, MBC 3, and MBC 4). Not all of
these channels are equally successful, but a few regularly attract a mass audience.
What kinds of programs attract Arab viewers in
large numbers? There are many factors that can
explain audience attraction and retention, but the
most popular Arab television programs have been
those with the following features: (1) historical or
political resonance, (2) narratives of social mobility, (3) and interactive features. If we consider the
last three or four years, we see that talk shows,
reality television, and drama series with historical
or political themes are ratings busters. During
Ramadan, the year’s most important month for

Arab media industries and the equivalent of the
“sweeps” in US television, drama series attract the
largest audiences.9 Two shows dominated the ratings and discussions this year. The first, King
Faruq, revisits an important period in Egyptian
history that led to the rise of Gamal Abdul Nasser.
The second, Bab Al-Hara (The Neighborhood
Gate), is a nostalgic look at social life in a
Damascene community, offering a powerful vision
of a simpler, more meaningful and locally centered
life. A few other hits in recent Ramadan seasons
have followed the making of terrorists from
Afghanistan camps to the streets of Arab capitals,
or explored the attraction of religious ideas for
segments of Arab youth. Reality TV shows like
Star Academy and Superstar have also been
immensely popular, precisely because they stage
competitions whose outcomes are interactively
decided by viewers voting for contestants who
move from anonymity to stardom within a few
months.10 The dynamism and interaction on
pugilistic talk shows also attract viewers, especially when they are able to call in and express their
opinions. Historical resonance, social mobility,
and the possibility for viewers to interact with
programming content (not to mention the revealing wardrobe of alluring program hosts and
guests) are key indicators of popularity.
Grasping the complexity of the Arab media environment entails moving beyond asking whether an
Arab media outlet is “anti-American” or “proAmerican.” It is clear even to the casual observer
that Al-Arabiya and LBC-Al-Hayat are friendlier
to the United States than Al-Jazeera is. Beyond
these obvious differences, however, the complexity
of the Arab media scene makes binary distinctions
(anti/pro) superficial and unhelpful. Though some
institutions display biases for or against US policy,
many channels present a more ambivalent package. Some Arab media outlets create dilemmas
because they advocate some declared US objectives, even if indirectly, while countering others,
sometimes directly. Consider the Lebanese satellite
television channel New TV. Initially launched as a
platform for the Lebanese Communist Party, the
channel is currently owned by businessman
Tahseen Khayyat but maintains its leftist stance.
New TV has led a relentless anticorruption drive in
Lebanon, coupled with a staunchly secularist editorial line and a multi-sectarian staff, a rare occurrence in Lebanon’s sectarian media landscape. The
channel’s editorial line is also sharply critical of US
policies in the Middle East. New TV is an excellent

example of local, relatively independent (the channel’s owner reportedly has political and business
links in Qatar, Libya, and Tunisia) media that
advocates economic and political transparency and
a secular outlook that is nonetheless critical of the
United States’ agenda in the Middle East. To recapitulate, New TV is aligned with two professed US
policy goals to (1) promote nonsectarianism and
(2) tackle corruption and foster transparency in
governance, while also criticizing US policy in the
Middle East. It is extremely difficult for US broadcasts to compete with such a channel. Arguably,
New TV presents more positives than negatives,
since its tough reporting on corruption is unique
and its nonsectarianism rare in the pan-Arab
media industry, while its criticism of US policy is
shared by numerous pan-Arab channels. To appreciate that balance, however, US policymakers will
have to put long-term policy goals ahead of immediate foreign policy needs, which is an arduous
task in the age of the 24-hour news cycle.
The economic impact of the pan-Arab media scene
is difficult to measure in the absence of reliable
information about the advertising market.
Available data reflect publicly available “ratecard” figures, which are larger than the amounts
that are actually paid. However, there is a considerable economic impact in that the media sector
employs a growing number of Arab citizens, especially younger men and women. The success of
these media institutions has an economic impact
beyond their owners. As Dubai emerged as an
Arab media capital, it siphoned off mostly young
and qualified media workers from throughout the
Arabic-speaking world, creating disequilibrium in
other media markets. The media’s economic
impact is sometimes felt locally. For example,
when the Lebanese channel MTV, a minor institution by today’s Arab television standards, was shut
down in 2003 by Lebanese authorities under
Syrian pressure, more than 300 families lost their
livelihood. Because they are increasingly important
employers, Arab media institutions play a growing
socioeconomic role. As a result, people feel protective of these socially embedded institutions, and
harsh criticism of Arab media from Washington
adds to negative opinions of the United States.
Though television remains by far the most influential medium in the Arab world, the pan-Arab
media scene is not restricted to television. Mobile
phones and other portable devices are now part
and parcel of the new Arab media environment.
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(Internet penetration rates are still comparatively
low, with the exception of the small Gulf States.)
In fact, the most successful media institutions in
the Arab world integrate multiple media in their
production and programming strategies. This is
especially the case in entertainment programs,
where the use of text-messaging by viewers to
nominate, select, vote, or express opinion are
now ubiquitous. This media convergence is driven by business considerations. In a region where
audience measurements and ratings remain not
fully reliable, embedding interactive multimedia
features enables a new business model. Every
time a viewer votes, nominates, or selects using
text-messaging, they pay a fee. This income is
rumored to have matched, even surpassed, advertising revenues in some cases.
The impact of media convergence is not only at
the economic level. The new Arab communication environment creates social and political
opportunities, and security challenges. The connectedness between different media, due to
commercially driven technological convergence,
creates new ways to communicate and to reach
new publics. When average citizens can connect
mobile phones and television, traditional communication patterns are transformed as access
to the means of communication becomes easier
and more widely spread. The resulting situation, one I have called “hypermedia space,”
enables social and political communication that
previously may not have been allowed.11 It also
allows any social group, including terrorist
organizations, access to public space through
media convergence. A short video of a beheading taken on a mobile phone and then posted on
the Internet makes its way to local, pan-Arab,
and subsequently global television screens,
Internet sites, and newspaper front pages.
Perhaps more importantly, Arab hypermedia
space, with its interactivity, stealth, and slick
multimedia gimmicks, exposes the gaping hole
between the vibrancy of the Arab media sector
and the stagnancy of Arab politics. Viewers used
to calling in live and venting about their rulers’
incompetence on one of Al-Jazeera’s shows are
all the more frustrated when they hang up and
return to a world where their words make no
difference whatsoever. The pan-Arab airwaves
simply are more pluralistic and free-wheeling
than Arab streets and parliaments, and the connection between screen and street has been weak

and sporadic—Lebanon’s 2005 Independence
Intifada, known in Washington as the “Cedar
Revolution,” one of those moments when television screens and Arab streets were in sync, was
short-lived, but its memory makes the current
standoff over Lebanon’s presidential election all the
more bitter. Similarly, the Damascus Spring initiated by the newly minted president Bashar Al-Asad,
which was widely covered in the Arab media,
quickly sunk into a frigid winter of repression.
When I convened a meeting of distinguished public diplomacy practitioners, journalists, and
scholarly experts in Washington, DC, last year,
the gap between media dynamism and political
stagnation emerged as the most important longterm dimension of the growth of Arab media.12
The vast expansion of media discourse raises
hopes and aspirations that are then dashed by
authoritarian politics. This paradox breeds
extremism and sets the ground for resentment,
instability, and violence.13

A Public Diplomacy Reset
In sharp contrast to the historically resonant,
locally relevant and interactive content of the
Arab media environment, the US government’s
Al-Hurra television has offered talking-head
newscasts, talk shows, and documentaries, in a
below-average graphic package. In all fairness,
the US government-funded channel has brought
to Arab audiences some interesting and in some
cases provocative documentaries and talk shows.
Nonetheless, Al-Hurra cannot compete with the
vibrant mix of historically resonant, creatively
produced, and locally meaningful programming
offered by the leading pan-Arab channels. Efforts
to reach Arab viewers must take into account the
region’s news priorities, and avoid costly mistakes like the infamous broadcast of a cooking
show at the time when virtually all Arab and
Western news channels were covering live the
assassination by the Israeli military of Hamas
founder Sheikh Yassin. Reaching Arab viewers
entails broadcasting content featuring characters
that US policymakers consider unsavory or even
dangerous. Attacks from Capitol Hill or The Wall
Street Journal on Voice of America for wanting to
air an interview with Taliban leader Mullah
Omar, or on the new Al-Hurra management for
airing a speech by Hezbollah Secretary General
Hassan Nasrallah are counterproductive because
they are based on ideology rather than expert
knowledge. Leading by example and giving space

to different, even those considered enemy, views
contributes to improving the reputation of the
United States.
US global communication efforts are also undermined by their close identification in the minds of
their receivers with the “global war on terrorism,”
which has tainted America’s relationship with the
rest of the world. The unilateralist policies and
actions this war has engendered—especially the
invasion of Iraq—coupled with the confrontational “you are with us or you are against us” rhetoric, has turned the Middle East, and many other
parts of the world, into a minefield for US diplomacy. At the same time, the rhetoric of bringing
freedom, democracy, and “civilization” to the
Middle East, besides reminding the region’s populations of their past experience with European
colonialism and imperialism, sets up overly ambitious objectives and exposes the gap between stated objectives and actual policy.
Consider the striking difference between the two
visits that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
made to Egypt. During the first visit, in June
2005, in a widely covered speech, she tersely
instructed: “The Egyptian government must fulfill the promise it made to its people,” which
included “free elections,” an “independent judiciary,” and freedom “to assemble, and to participate, and to speak to the media.”14 This was in
stark contrast with her second, October 2007,
visit when Secretary Rice answered a reporter’s
question about democratization in Egypt in a
subdued tone, saying: “Many positive things are
happening. Economically, a lot of things are happening. But we do have concerns about political
events here. I raised, for instance, our concerns
about the detention of journalists, and we have
had a discussion of those issues.”15 This clear
example of inconsistency in US policy undercuts
public diplomacy.
Similarly, Palestinian elections, which resulted in
the victory of Hamas and the recent declaration
of a state of emergency by Pakistani strongman
and key US ally in the fight against terrorism
Pervez Musharraf, are challenging developments
that leave the United States open to accusations
of double standards. Discrepancies between US
past rhetoric and present actions provide opportunities for unsympathetic Arab columnists, talk
show hosts, and (to a lesser, but growing extent)
bloggers to criticize US policies.
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To counter hostile perceptions in the Arab world,
the Bush administration has resorted to censorship and counterpropaganda. News that the
Pentagon was censoring pictures of the coffins of
US service men and women killed in Afghanistan
or Iraq, or that White House officials were
“coordinating” with US networks on how to
cover the war on terrorism, were aired in the US
and Arab media, adding to the negative perception that the US government could not be trusted. These impressions were greatly amplified by
news stories that US authorities in Iraq were
planting stories in Iraqi newspapers that cast US
troops in a good light, or “subsidizing” Iraqi
journalists to ensure positive coverage.16
These actions are problematic not only at the ethical level; they are also public diplomacy blunders.
In an Arab world awash in media and information, these news items become part of the story,
fueling exactly the currents in public opinion they
were intended to weaken. US policymakers would
do well to heed the admonition in the Advisory
Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and
Muslim World report “Changing Minds, Winning
Peace: A New Strategic Direction for US Public
Diplomacy in the Arab World,” which unequivocally stated that US public diplomacy should be
about “candor and confidence, not spin and
sugar-coating” because “manipulative public relations and propaganda are not the answer.” This is
because, as the report put it succinctly, “Foreign
policy counts.”17

The Crux of the Problem:
Policies Before Values
Though a small, extremist minority may hate
values that Americans share with many other
nations and cultures, more Arabs are turned off
by US policies in the Middle East. Supporting
authoritarian Arab leaders and Israeli policies
toward the Palestinians contribute to Arab attitudes toward the United States. Numerous
studies have confirmed that US policies and perceptions of these policies, and not a difference
of values, are the root cause of the US image
problem in the Arab world.
A February-March 2003 survey of Arab public
opinion by Telhami found that US policy clearly
outweighed respondents’ values as a determinant
of attitudes toward the United States, in some
cases in factors of 2 to 1 (33% and 67% in Saudi
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Arabia; 29% and 58% in Lebanon).18 Similarly, a
2004 six-nation survey probed the relative importance of values and policies in determining Arab
attitudes toward the United States. Findings indicated that values were the main determinant for
18% of respondents in Morocco, 10% in Saudi
Arabia, 16% in Jordan, 9% in Lebanon, and 9%
in the United Arab Emirates. In contrast, US
policies were the main determinant for 79% of
respondents in Morocco, 86% in Saudi Arabia,
76% in Jordan, 89% in Lebanon, and 75% in the
United Arab Emirates.19 US policy outweighed US
values in all six Arab countries surveyed, at 59%
vs. 10% in Egypt, 83% vs. 11% in Jordan, 76%
vs. 19% in Lebanon, 88% vs. 7% in Morocco,
77% vs. 18% in Saudi Arabia, and 58% vs. 40%
in the United Arab Emirates.20 Clearly, disagreement over policy outweighs differences in values
by several orders of magnitude. Like many
Europeans, many Arabs “love the idea of
America, but they are not always so enamored by
the practice.”21
The tendency of the Bush administration to
view US image problems in the Arab world
through the prism of values as opposed to policy may stem from the influence of the “clash of
civilizations” approach to international relations. In spite of the fact that this approach is
not supported by the voluminous data cited
above, it has led to an excessive emphasis on
religion as an important factor to explain widespread Arab negative opinions of the United
States. In fact, Islam is a factor, but not a very
significant one, in determining attitudes toward
the United States. There is sparse data about
this sensitive issue, but polling Lebanese
Christians revealed that the favorable-to-unfavorable ratio among them was 24% to 69%,
while among Muslims it was 17% to 75%. In
terms of US “Policy toward Arabs,” the numbers
were 4% favorable and 90% unfavorable among
Muslims, and 7% to 89% among Christians.
Proportions for “Policy toward Palestinians”
were 3% and 90% among Muslims, and 5% and
91% among Christians. Religion, the pollster
concluded, “appears to play a negligible role in
shaping attitudes toward America.”22 While for
some Muslims religion may be a basis for their
opposition to the United States, Islam should be
considered one variable among numerous others, and not the most important, independent
variable that determines attitudes toward the
United States.

The Impact of Globalization
US policy assumes that the main reasons for hostility toward the United States are religious, ideological, or political, while in fact economic
reasons loom large in negative perceptions of the
United States. Policymakers should take into
account growing resentment over the widening
economic gap between rich and poor in most
parts of the world and in the Arab world in particular. As a Congressional Research Service
report put it, “… there is a tendency to blame USled globalization for the region’s economic ills.”23
It is crucial for US policymakers to understand the
impact of globalization on people’s lives and, perhaps as importantly, how negative perceptions of
globalization are intricately linked to US foreign
policy in the Middle East. Many Arabs view USled globalization as a successor of European colonialism and imperialism, which seeks to control
their resources and weaken their countries.
According to a report on public diplomacy by the
United States Government Accountability Office,
“US support for globalization, which is viewed as
hurting Muslims” (p. 25) is a major root cause of
anti-Americanism, alongside “the Arab/Israeli
conflict, the war in Iraq, US support for antidemocratic regimes in the region, [and] perceptions of
US imperialism.”24 Another report concludes that
“US policies are widely viewed as increasing the
gap between rich nations and poor nations.”25 US
support for oil-wealthy Gulf monarchies also
exposes the United States to resentment in less
wealthy Arab societies.
Indeed, a Pew worldwide poll of “influential people in politics, media, business, culture and government” conducted a few months after the
attacks of September 11, 2001, found that,
among “major reasons for disliking the United
States,” 59% of those polled in the Mideast
named the perception that the United States causes a gap between rich and poor, more than those
who named US support of Israel, 57%, compared
to 54% who cited their resentment of US power
as a major reason to dislike the United States.26
Similarly, a poll conducted by Birzeit University
in the West Bank in October 2001 found that
86.5% of those polled agree that “the United
States is “[r]ich at the expense of poor nations.”27
The finding that global economic governance is a
source for anti-US sentiment for more Arabs than
US support for Israel dramatically illustrates the
importance of this issue, even if a recent poll

found a more complex situation whereby “[t]he
publics of the world broadly embrace key tenets
of economic globalization but fear the disruptions and downsides of participating in the global economy.”28
Globalization is associated with what many
Arabs see as US double standards. Indeed, there
are perceptions that the United States does not
really believe in free-wheeling economic and cultural exchanges and that it uses globalization as
a one-way instrument to grab a large share of the
world’s wealth. The controversy over the Dubai
Ports then-impending acquisition of docking
operations in US ports, and the strongly negative
reactions it triggered among US politicians, even
if President Bush was initially supportive of the
deal, was heavily covered in the Arab media and
resonated significantly with Arabs as an example
of US double standards when it comes to globalization (i.e., the impression that it is acceptable
for US companies to acquire Arab commercial
interests while the reverse is not acceptable to US
authorities). The coverage of the botched US
government response to Hurricane Katrina and
pictures of urban poverty in the world’s wealthiest nation added to the impression of a callous
superpower that does not care about the weak
and the poor.

The Trouble With “Branding”
US public diplomacy has often been discussed
in terms of “branding” the United States.
Commenting on the appointment of advertising
executive Charlotte Beers as the first Under
Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, then
Secretary of State Colin Powell praised Beers by
saying that “she got me to buy Uncle Ben’s
rice.”29 Though the notion of nation-branding
enjoys popularity, the branding metaphor is
problematic for US public diplomacy for several reasons.
Branding is an often misunderstood and misused
label. In this context, US public diplomacy practitioners appear to be addressing the overall
image of the United States when they refer to
“brand.” This oversimplification of national
image has backfired in US global communication
efforts. A country and the vast array of its policies, especially when it is the sole global superpower, are a great deal more difficult to brand
than a consumer item. As journalist Naomi Klein
succinctly put it, “America is not a hamburger.”30

Moving beyond a simplistic notion of branding
would enable an understanding of the complexities inherent in promoting the image of a country
as powerful and globally visible as the United
States. It is difficult to maintain “brand consistency” in promoting the US image overseas, precisely because a brand is a relationship to be
nurtured, not an image to be advertised.
Educated Arabs appear to understand, seemingly better than some US policymakers do, that the
United States is radically pluralistic. On frequent trips in the Middle East over the last few
years, I was surprised how well-known dissident
American authors like Michael Moore and
Noam Chomsky were—in addition to other US
public figures. Seymour Hersh’s recent articles
about US policy toward Iran and Hezbollah in
The New Yorker have made him a household
name in Arab capitals. Among Arabs who read
or know of these authors, even some of the most
ardent critics of the Bush administration’s policies concede that it is because freedom of speech
is upheld in the United States that these authors
can write what they write and that they would
be jailed or worse if they published similar criticism in the Arab world. Nonetheless, when US
words and actions are incompatible, people
more readily remember the negative elements.
Especially challenging in regard to brand consistency are the highly visible contradictions inherent
in US policy toward the Middle East. US support
of democracy wavers when allies lose elections;
support of friendly dictators belies words about
freedom. The result is a lack of credibility. One
survey of Arabs’ attitudes toward the United States
found 65% of respondents believed that “democracy is not a real US objective,” while 5% believed
it was an important US objective that will make a
difference and 16% believed it was an important
objective but that the United States is “doing it the
wrong way.”31 Anger at the United States comes
from “a clear perception of false advertising,”32
which stems from the difference between stated US
goals and actual US policies and actions. As a
Stanley Foundation report on Arab media and the
US image in the Middle East put it, “US policies
need to align not only with positive regional trends
but also with each other.”33
One solution recommended to help remedy contradictions in US policy is to segment the audience and tackle it one section at a time, offering
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multiple “sub-brands” of the United States in several Arab countries. In this approach, advocated
among other places in the 2006 GAO report,
each Arab country (or groups of them) is offered
different “brands” of the United States. It is generally valid to argue that “policymakers need to
constantly assess the landscape by region, by
country, by audience, and by medium.”34 The
problem with audience segmentation in the Arab
world is that truly local media are nonexistent.
Many governments transmit national television
broadcasts via satellite; the Internet (even if for
the moment access remains limited) is trans-local,
and so are the electronic versions of the newspapers on it. FM radio remains for the time being
more local than other media, but its signals do
spill over national borders. Low Internet penetration rates mean that this is still not a significant
medium for the Arab population at large, but an
important link to the Arab elite. Music television,
business, and women’s channels can be said to be
niche media amenable to a segmentation strategy,
but they would be awkward platforms for public
diplomacy efforts. Because of the lack of local
media, segmenting the Arab audience may lead to
even greater inconsistency in the US image presented to the region.

Toward a New Multilateralism
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, US policy has taken a decidedly unilateralist direction, dismissing the United Nations, brushing off concerns
expressed by allies, and enshrining an overall “go
it alone” tendency in a preemptive strike doctrine
communicated through a “you’re with us or you’re
against us” rhetoric. Unilateralism has negatively
affected the US image since, according to the Pew
Charitable Trusts, “the view that the US acts unilaterally is an opinion that has tracked closely with
America’s overall image over the past five years.”35
Conversely, the perception that other leaders act
multilaterally enhanced their standing considerably. Consider the reputation of former French
president Jacques Chirac. After the invasion of
Iraq in 2003, while some Washington politicians
were busy changing “French fries” to “Freedom
fries,” Arabs took notice of Chirac’s opposition
to the Iraq war and his insistence on referring to
the United Nations as an institutional framework
for resolving the crisis. When asked about which
world leaders they trusted to “do the right
thing,” Chirac ranked first in three Arab countries—61% of those polled in Jordan named the

then French president, as did 81% in Lebanon,
and 65% in Morocco—and third among
Palestinians, where 32% named him as a leader
in whom they have confidence.36 Similarly, a poll
conducted in 2006 by Telhami and Zogby
International revealed that Chirac was (at 8%)
the second most admired leader outside of the
respondents home countries of Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates. The fact that the first most
admired leader was Hezbollah leader Hassan
Nasrallah (14%), and that Iranian president
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (4%) and Venezuelan
president Hugo Chavez (3%) ranked third and
fourth, respectively, speaks to the depth and
scope of the US reputation crisis.37 France also
received consistently top ratings among Arabs for
the preferred country to live in, and for the preferred country to be a superpower.
This difference between the United States and
France, two Western countries with many similarities, cannot be caused by a disagreement
with, let alone a hatred of, US values. Neither
can it be simply attributed to the fact that France
does spend more per capita on public diplomacy
than the United States’ annual nearly $ 1.5 billion,38 though it does suggest that US spending
needs to increase. Nor can it be explained by the
United States and France’s respective treatment
of their Muslim population, where France has
witnessed protracted problems that the United
States has not. (Overall, French Muslims tend to
be poorer and less integrated than their US coreligionists.) Rather, positive images of France
and its leaders compared to negative images of
the United States can be largely explained by
France’s public insistence on negotiated and multilateral solutions of crises in its foreign policy,
even when it pursued an aggressive and largely
failed domestic policy toward its Muslim population. The same pattern is discernable in late
2007 with French diplomatic efforts to defuse
the tense political situation in Lebanon and come
up with a consensus candidate for the Lebanese
presidency, as opposed to US policy, which basically consists of supporting the Siniora government and threatening Hezbollah and Syria. It
does not matter whether the French are genuinely committed to multilateralism and diplomacy,
or as some suggested in the case of Iraq, were
simply mounting a challenge to the United
States. What matters is that Arab public opinion
sees a wide gap between US and French policy,

action and rhetoric. What matters even more is
that these perceptions translate into an image of
France that looks all the more positive when
compared to the dismal US image, despite
France’s tough domestic policy on Muslims.
The United States should go back to being a rule
maker, not a rule breaker. The CSIS Commission
on Smart Power, headed by Joseph Nye Jr. and
Richard Armitage, identified “public diplomacy”
and “alliances, partnerships, and institutions” as
two areas out of five critically important areas,
with the objective of rebuilding “the foundation
to deal with global challenges.”39 Like others
before it, this group recognized that policies that
stem from multilateral consultations are credible
and legitimate, and that countries find their reputations enhanced when they pursue policies that
enjoy credibility and legitimacy. However, “multilateralism cannot be merely a public relations
strategy designed to provide political cover for
unilateral action.”40 Working with others must
become institutionalized in US foreign policy.
A renewed US multilateralism must also go
beyond Track I diplomacy and integrate numerous state and nonstate actors. In the Arab world,
it would mean promoting exchanges between
journalists, creative media workers, and students
in these critical areas. Existing programs should
be expanded, especially Fulbright fellowships in
the area of journalism, communication, and
media studies whose numbers should be tripled.
To mitigate the impression that this is US indoctrination, the United States should consider partnering with Arab and European professional,
academic, and civil society organizations focused
on media and communication.
A sensible, engaged, and firm multilateral strategy
to pressure Arab governments could be implemented behind the scenes, dedicated to help change
media laws, enhance journalistic autonomy, and
promote homegrown independent media. The current approach of self-righteous public rhetoric and
inconsistent action should be reversed. US officials
should make less grandstanding statements in public to the effect that Arab rulers should allow more
freedom and apply more discrete diplomatic pressure. These efforts should foster independent localism, where media institutions cease to be foreign
policy instruments for Arab states to use against
their neighbors, and re-focus on their domestic
scenes, from attack dogs to watchdogs.

So as not to be seen as promoting double standards, US policymakers should also stop complaining about the Arab news media’s focus on
the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq. These are
important to Arabs, so they are important to
Arab media. In news coverage, localism and panArab regionalism can occur simultaneously. The
existence of relatively independent media has
added benefits. It exposes corruption, contributes
to more transparent economies, and fosters higher educational and health standards.41
In addition to fostering this independent localism in the news media, a series of basic, commonsensical steps should be undertaken by the
US government. First, create an empowered and
more autonomous public diplomacy organism
and give its head an office in the White House as
special advisor to the president, which would
give him/her more power than currently enjoyed
by the Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy. Second, increase public diplomacy
funding, expand Arab language training, and set
up a structure of incentives to learn Arabic; for
example, shortening rotations in the Middle
East, which are currently among the longest for
US diplomats. Third, provide Arab journalists
with wider and easier access to US sources; facilitate visa and airport entry procedures, especially for students and journalists; and make sure
US consular staff are adequately trained in
human relations.
Finally, consider bold and imaginative initiatives.
For example, establish a Global Endowment for
Creativity (GEC) with other donor nations. This
would be in the best spirit of the new multilateralism, bringing together public servants, artists,
intellectuals, and community and business leaders. Like the national endowments for the arts
and for the humanities, the new body, funded and
managed jointly with international partners,
including Japan, the European Union, and perhaps even China, should award grants and fellowships to artists, intellectuals, directors,
producers, and journalists from the Middle East.
Furthermore, GEC should sponsor annual literary and media competitions, whose winners will
be granted wide distribution or publication. Even
if some participating or winning projects turn out
to be critical of US policy, they should not be
excluded. The gain in US reputation from including them would probably outweigh the effects of
criticism. It would show a congruence of values
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and actions that would be a formidable charm
offensive and could have a deeply and widely
transformative impact because it demonstrates
that freedom of speech and respect for opposing
opinions are actually practiced values, not instrumental rhetoric.

Conclusion
The poor reputation of the United States in the
Arab world is not a communication problem that
can be solved with communication processes; it is
a substantive policy issue that must be solved by
smart policies whose rationales and objectives
must be skillfully communicated. As the prominent Arab journalist Rami Khoury wrote,
“People in Washington who think” that Arab
perceptions of the United States can be fixed
through better communication channels “are
offering counterproductive projects, reflecting
inappropriate policies, based on inaccurate analyses, stemming from faulty diagnoses.”42
Communication is like mortar holding the bricks of
an edifice together; just as we cannot substitute
mortar for bricks, we cannot substitute communication for credible, legitimate policies. Following
this recognition, one of the first foreign policy
actions of the incoming administration should be to
shut down Al-Hurra television, and offer qualified
members of its staff other jobs in public diplomacy.
In the same vein, the search for new technologies
and new channels to influence Arabs is counterproductive in the absence of a strategic understanding of the importance of credibility and
legitimacy. There are also technical and social
limitations. E-Diplomacy sounds great, but in key
Arab countries Internet penetration hovers
around 1%, and will not be substantially affected
by providing Internet access at American
Corners. Using personal, interactive devices like
mobile phones can also backfire. The effective use
of such technologies is based on interpersonal
intimacy and social trust, and governments have
abysmal levels of both. As a matter of strategy,
US public diplomacy should avoid propagandalike “push” media like Al-Hurra, and focus on
“pull” media—those media that listeners, viewers, and users can themselves pull off library
shelves, points of sale, and as connectivity
increases in the future, the Internet.
It is important for US public diplomats to keep in
mind that the US image problem in the Arab

world for the most part is neither the message nor
the medium. The problem resides in actions and
policies. The silver lining in all of this is that negative perceptions of the United States in the Arab
world are neither old nor immutable. They are
the result of US policies43 and, as a result, they can
be turned around. The first step to effect the
needed transformation is to abandon the “global
war on terror” as the US government’s main
framework for global engagement. This means
ending the use of both preemptive action and
confrontational rhetoric; integrating social and
economic concerns in foreign policy and public
diplomacy; and refocusing the full power, influence, and resources of the United States to broker
a sustainable, comprehensive peace in the Middle
East, an achievement that 62% of Arab respondents to a study said would improve their view of
the United States—the most of several possible
US actions.44 Efforts should focus on comprehending the Arab world as a differentiated area
with multiple identities and concerns, without
losing sight of the major, pan-Arab issues. In this
endeavor, the most difficult, and most important
challenge, is to balance long-term strategic objectives with short-term desired outcomes.
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